physical evil is the natural consequence and punishment of moral evil. The guilty man stands in constant fear of a penalty to follow; and the conscience approves of appropriate punishment being inflicted on sin. Such is the very constitution of man's nature. It not only declares sin to be an evil., and pain to be an evil, but declares that the one is the proper punishment of the other. It seems, then, as if we could free ourselves from many of the difficulties connected with the infliction of pain, provided we could refer it to moral evil as its source. This, we are aware, is widely different from the view adopted by the superficial thinkers of this age. They justify the infliction of suffering on the ground of its ultimately producing a greater amount of happiness; and they speak as if happiness were the only good, and pain the only evil. But certainly this is not the doctrine sanctioned by the intuitive and fundamental principles of man's nature. Place man in a position in which he must choose between sin and pain, and the conscience will at once announce that the latter should be the alternative adopted. The mind, in short., declares that there is a greater good than mere happiness, and a greater evil than pain, and that suffering is the appropriate punishment of transgression.

The spirit of the present age is much opposed to everything *punitive*. It is the natural recoil of the human mind from the barbarities, the cruelty, and revenge of former generations. The general rule is now laid down, that human punishment ought to be strictly reformatory, and have in view solely the welfare of the individual and of society. We are not disposed to cavil at this principle. We tremble at the idea of man being made the avenger of the laws of the Governor of the universe. The magistrate has no doubt a delegated power from heaven; but it were as safe, to say the least of it, in him to confine its exercise within the limits prescribed by the principle that

the reformation of society should be his end and aim. But there is a previous inquiry, Is it allowable that the magistrate punish *except when punishment is deserved?* We hold it to be demonstrable, that he is not at liberty to punish, unless a crime meriting punishment has been committed. He is not permitted, it is manifest, to inflict pain *merely* for the good of society; to visit, for example, with imprisonment or death, an individual who has innocently committed an injurious act. True it is that he does